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NOTES
defendant was so intoxicated as to preclude the presence of a
specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, the appro-
priate verdict might well be manslaughter. Manslaughter is de-
fined a's "a homicide without any intent to cause death or great
bodily harm when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration . . .of any intentional misdemeanor di-
rectly affecting the person."' 6 Thus, if death results from a bat-
tery, either aggravated or simple, the elements of the crime of
manslaughter are present. Intoxication could not be used as a
defense to the battery which would be the basis of the man-
slaughter charge because battery requires only a general crim-
inal intent, which under the law is not precluded by intoxication.
Therefore, any charge to the jury on intoxication would be mis-
leading if it did not include an explanation of its application to
this responsive verdict. The Louisiana Supreme Court has ap-
proved the practice of simply reading R.S. 14:15 to the jury in
order to instruct them on the law relative to intoxication as a
defense.'7 However, this is an area where a bare statement of
the law is likely to confuse a jury. It will greatly facilitate a
proper jury understanding of the issues involved if the judge
elaborates upon the application of the intoxication article to the
crime charged and to the crimes which may be responsive
verdicts.
Allen B. Pierson, Jr.
EVIDENCE- GENERAL HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGE
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
Defendant was convicted, under the Mann Act,' for trans-
porting the prosecutrix from Arkansas into Oklahoma for im-
moral purposes. During the trial defendant's wife was allowed,
over his objection, to testify that she was a prostitute and that
the prosecutrix was coming to Oklahoma to go into business with
her. Defendant claimed the husband-wife privilege and the gov-
ernment contended that the wife's testimony was allowable be-
cause it was given voluntarily. The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the district court in allowing the wife to testify
voluntarily. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, held, reversed.
In the interests of fostering peace in the family, a spouse will
not be permitted to testify against the other, even voluntarily,
16. LA. R.S. 14:31(2a) (1950). Clauses (1) and (2b) defining manslaughter
in other ways are not applicable here.
17. State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1949).
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over objection of the accused spouse. Hawkins v. United States,
79 Sup. Ct. 136 (U.S. 1958).
The federal courts have two systems by which the applicable
rules of evidence are determined. In civil cases the courts con-
sider the rules of the state in which the court is sitting, as well
as the rules applied in the old federal equity cases, and then
apply the more lenient of the rules.2 In criminal cases, in an
effort to effect uniformity in their prosecutions, the courts use
the common law rules of evidence as presently interpreted in the
light of reason and experience. 3
Centuries ago the rule4 was formulated in the common law
that neither the husband nor the wife could testify for or against
the other.5 No one was allowed to give testimony for his own
cause because of the obvious interest involved ;6 and since in legal
fiction the husband and wife were considered one,7 a spouse was
precluded from so testifying.8 The dominant reason 9 for not al-
2. 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1948). See Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under
the Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REV. 197 (1941).
3. The present rule for federal criminal trials as to evidence is that it is to
be the common law as interpreted by present day courts "in the light of reason
and experience." This phrase was used by Justice Stone in Wolfie v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934) as descriptive of the standard employed in Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). This criterion was codified in 1940 in Rule
26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: "The admissibility of evidence and
the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act
of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience." See also Sharp v. United States, 195 F.2d 997 (6th Cir.
1952). It should be noted that this is approximately the same rule that was fol-
lowed prior to the Funk case. See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892)
Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23 (9th Cir. 1914).
4. The credit or condemnation for formulating this rule is usually given to Sir
Edward Coke, Commentary on Littleton 6b. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 600 (3d ed.
1948) ; 8 id. § 2227. One exception has been recognized to this rule. When one
spouse directly injured the other, the injured spouse was allowed to testify against
him. For further discussion of this "necessity" rule, see Rex v. Azire, 1 Str. 633,
93 Eng. Rep. 746 (K.B. 1725) ; Lord Audley's Case, 1 Hat. 115, 123 Eng. Rep.
1140 (C.P. 1631) ; State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 S.W. 1106 (1894) ; 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2239 (3d ed. 1940).
5. The general husband-wife rule dealt with in this Note should be distinguished
from the confidential connubial communication privilege. This latter privilege has
quite different, and perhaps stronger, reasons for its existence, and may be gen-
erally stated as preventing the disclosure of confidential communications made be-
tween the spouses during the marriage. See United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d
1006 (2d Cir. 1943) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 82-91 (1954) ; 8 WIOMORE, EvI-
DENCE §§ 2332-2341 (3d ed. 1940).
6. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 376, 384 (1842) ; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 601 (3d
ed. 1940).
7. COKE, LiTT. § 6b-"two souls in one flesh."
8. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 384 (1842). The rule prohibiting spousal testimony
for each other is made because of interest. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254
U.S. 189 (1920).
9. For other reasons advanced for the rule, see 2 WIGM OE, EVIDENCE § 601
(3d ed. 1940) ; 8 id. § 2228.
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lowing testimony by one spouse against the other was to protect
the sanctity of the marital relationship.10 This reason was one
of policy; it was felt that if a husband and wife were pitted
against each other it would create marital disharmony and there-
by cause harm not only to the husbands, wives, and children in-
volved, but also to the institution of marriage. Under the rule as
originally formulated, spouses were said to be incompetent to
testify for or against each other." Both reasons, interest and
protection of marriage, supported the old rule of incompetency.
However, as the rule received continued use, scholars came to the
conclusion that the rule actually had two quite separate phases.12
The first phase, testimony by one spouse for the other, was con-
sidered to be one aimed at the competency of the witness ;1s its
primary basis was interest. Thus the testimony was excludable
because it was considered unreliable and untrustworthy. 14  The
second phase, testimony against one spouse by the other, had as
10. Mary Grigg's Case, Raym. Sir T. 1, 83 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1660) ; Staple-
ton v. Crofts, 18 Q.B. 367, 118 Eng. Rep. 137 (1852) ; Clements v. Marston, 52
N.H. 31 (1872) ; GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 384 (1842) ; 2 WIDMoRE, EVIDENCE § 601
(3d ed. 1940) ; 8 id. § 2228. See argument by Mr. Evarts in Tilton v. Beecher, 2
Abbott's Rep. 49 (N.Y. 1875), as quoted in 8 WIoMoBE, EVIDENCE 226 (3d ed.
1940) : "The common law has said, great as is the interest of the administration
of justice, all-powerful as it should be, to draw into court all evidence that can
speak the truth within the rules of evidence, yet the administration of justice was
made for society, not society for the administration of justice; and there are cer-
tain institutions of society lying at the base of our civilization, sustaining the
whole fabric of its prosperity, its purity, its dignity, and its strength,- which. must
not be undermined, or corrupted, or disfigured, or defiled under the notion that in
the administration of justice the truth must be sought in every quarter and from
every witness. Thus the great minds, legislative and judicial, the great moralists,
the great religious teachers, have all combined to say that there are certain limits
imposed by the nature of human society in the fabric as it is constituted, for our
defense and protection, that cannot be overpassed. . . . When the common law
says that a man and his wife are one, or in Lord Coke's language, 'two souls in
one person'- it is said no man shall put asunder those who are thus joined to-
gether, and, least of all, in the name of law, shall the administration of justice
pull and tear asunder this conjugal relation by the step of the sheriff or the pre-
cept of the judge that compels one to come and betray the other. It is not, when
the question comes before the Court, so much the interest, or the duty, or the par-
ticular circumstances of the individual case of marriage that are thus brought up
for attention, as the institution itself."
11. See Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE
§ 798 (5th ed. 1958) ; S WIMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227 (3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 38 VA.
L. REV. 359 (1952).
12. MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 66 (1954) ; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 600 (3d ed.
1940) ; 8 id. § 2227; Note, 38 VA. L. REV. 359 (1952). This distinction has been
recognized in Oleander v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 42 A.L.R.2d 736 (9th Cir.
1954) ; Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23 (9th Cir. 1914).
13. See note 12 supra.
14. See note 6 supra.
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its primary basis the protection of the marital relationship. The
testimony, though reliable, I5 was excluded because the value to
society in finding the truth in particular cases was deemed less
than the value in protecting the marital relationship. 6 When-
ever the ascertainment of the facts is subordinated to the pro-
tection of a relationship, a privilege evolves because the question
is not one of reliability of the evidence, but rather concerns the
value of the relationship to society. 1" Thus the distinction be-
tween privilege and competency was drawn.
In 1839 the United States Supreme Court' enunciated the
rule that neither spouse could testify for or against the other
spouse. This rule remained intact, 9 though vigorously criti-
cized,20 until the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Funk v.
United States,21 holding that one spouse could testify for the
other. The court there said that the reason for the incompetency
rule, interest, had disappeared, since an accused could now testi-
fy for his own cause, thereby forcing the incompetency rule to
fall. The court in Funk limited its decision to the competency
rule, and expressly left open for further scrutiny the question of
testimony against one spouse by the other. However, a broad
policy of rejecting common law rules where the reasons behind
them could no longer be considered valid in the light of modern
reason and experience arose as a result of the Funk case. 22 This
led the lower courts to conflicting conclusions in regard to the
validity of the privilege rule prohibiting spouses from testifying
against each other.23
15. There is perhaps some question as to just how reliable this testimony might
be; however, basically it is considered reliable. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228
(3d ed. 1940).
16. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 66 (1954) ; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 600 (3d ed.
1940) ; 8 id. § 2227. See also note 10 8upra.
17. See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 72 (1954).
18. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839).
19. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920) ; Hendrix v. United
States, 219 U.S. 79 (1911) ; Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893);
Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1931) ; Fisher v. United States,
32 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1929) ; Barton v. United States, 25 F.2d 967 (4th Cir.
1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 621 (1928) ; Liberato v. United States, 13 F.2d
564 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Israel v. United States, 3 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1925) ; Slick
v. United States, 1 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1924) ; O'Brien v. United States, 299 Fed.
568 (8th Cir. 1924) ; Haddad v. United States, 294 Fed. 536 (6th Cir. 1923);
Krashowitz v. United States, 282 Fed. 599 (4th Cir. 1922) ; Fitter v. United
States, 258 Fed. 567 (2d Cir. 1919) ; Wesoky v. United States, 175 Fed. 333 (3d
Cir. 1910).
20. 5 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 337 (1828). See also 2
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 601 (3d ed. 1940) ; 8 id. § 2228; Brosman, Edward Living-
ston and Spousal Testimony in Louisiana, 11 TUL. L. REV. 243 (1937).
21. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
22. See note 3 8upra.
23. Compare Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935) and United
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NOTES
In the instant case the question of the validity of the privi-
lege, as possessed by the accused spouse, was presented to the
Supreme Court. The Court looked to the reasoning behind the
rule and to the experience that had been had with the rule. The
majority stated that the policy of protecting the sanctity of the
marital relationship "has never been unreasonable and is not
now." 24 Thus the phase of the rule prohibiting testimony against
one spouse by the other was sanctioned and upheld. However,
the Court was faced with a dual question, for the government did
not expressly seek to have the privilege as a whole overruled, but
rather to have it declared that the privilege belongs only to the
witness-spouse. The majority disposed of this contention by
saying that "it is difficult to see how family harmony is less dis-
turbed by a wife's voluntary testimony against her husband than
by her compelled testimony, ' 25 for, in truth, "it seems probable
that much more bitterness would be engendered. '2 The author
of the concurring opinion dealt further with the question of to
whom the privilege belonged. He stated that the government
might coerce the witness spouse into testifying, as may have been
done in the instant case, by threatening her with prosecution on
other grounds; and since in most cases it would be virtually im-
possible to determine when such testimony was in fact volun-
tary, he concluded that the privilege must belong to the accused
spouse in order to make the privilege a reality.
Within the various states the development of the husband-
wife exclusionary rule has differed from that in the federal sys-
tem, as the states have often legislated on the rule'2 7 while Con-
gress has remained silent.28 In Louisiana the common law rule
was adopted at an early date,29 but in 191630 it was abrogated by
a statute which provided: "Neither husband nor wife shall be
compelled to be a witness on any trial upon an indictment, com-
plaint or other criminal proceeding, against the other,"3' 1 and this
States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949)
Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948).
24. 79 Sup. Ct. 136, 138 (U.S. 1958).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. For an excellent work in which the rules of the various jurisdictions are
traced, see Note, 38 VA. L. REV. 359 (1952).
28. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) held that the civil provisions
had no application to criminal cases. In 1940, Congress enacted Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with rules of evidence generally, and lays
down no express rules. See note 3 supra.
29. La. Acts 1805, c. 50, § 33, p. 440. See Brosman, Edward Livingston and
Spousal Testimony in Louisiana, 11 Tu. L. REV. 243 (1937).
30. La. Acts 1916, No. 137, now LA. R.S. 15:461 (1950).
31. Ibid.
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language is retained in R.S. 15:461. Since this statute allows,
but does not compel, testimony, it is readily seen that only the
competency phase of the common law rule is removed, leaving
the privilege.8 2 But this privilege is severely limited because the
statute has been interpreted to mean that it belongs only to the
witness spouse, 8 to exercise at his option, which he must do be-
fore the jury. 4 The accused may force his spouse to testify in
his favor,8 5 and if he fails to do so the prosecutor may comment
on this failure.8 6 Thus unless the testimony of the spouse is
especially damning, it would seem that the protection given by
the privilege is negligible because the accused is subject to the
prosecutor's comments, which quite likely will make his situation
worse than if the testimony were given.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is sound,
for it would seem that the protection of the sanctity of the mari-
tal relationship, indeed the institution of marriage itself, is more
important than an ascertainment of truth in any particular case.
This decision will naturally have no direct effect outside of the
federal courts; however, its indirect influence may be felt in
the state systems. It is hoped that this influence will lead to a
reconsideration of the privilege statute in Louisiana, for it would
seem that the purpose behind the statute is not unlike the rea-
sons advanced by the majority in the instant case to support the
privilege. This purpose cannot be realized, however, as pointed
out in the concurring opinion, unless the privilege is in the hands
of the accused spouse.
Ray C. Muirhead
INCOME TAX - PROFIT ON SALE OF ENDOWMENT AND ANNUITY
POLICIES - CAPITAL GAIN OR ORDINARY INCOME?
Whether the sale of an endowment or annuity insurance
policy to a third person prior to its maturity results in capital
gain or ordinary income to the vendor is left in question by two
32. For a more complete treatment of Louisiana's position and the interpreta-
tion of the statute, see Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 427 (1954). This note
is current, as there seems to have been no cases on the points covered since its
writing.
33. State v. McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So.2d 574 (1953); State v. Dejean,
159 La. 900, 106 So. 374 (1925) ; State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924).
34. State v. McMullan, 223 La. 629, 66 So.2d 574 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 427 (1954).
35. State v. Todd, 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76 (1931).
36. Ibid.
[Vol. XIX
